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This report is published as a NICPRE research 
bulletin. The mission of NICPRE is to enhance the 
overall understanding of economic and policy issues 
associated with commodity promotion programs. An 
understanding of these issues is crucial to ensuring 
continued authorization for domestic checkoff programs 
and to fund export promotion programs.
Each year, NICPRE provides an updated 
analysis of the national dairy advertising program. This 
bulletin summarizes the independent evaluation of the 
National Dairy Promotion and Research Board. This 
report should help farmers, policy makers, and program 
managers in understanding the economic impacts of 
generic dairy advertising on the national markets for 
milk and dairy products. The report should also be 
useful for current legal debates on the effectiveness of 
commodity promotion programs in enhancing the 
profitability of fanners.
Executive Summary
The purpose of this study was to analyze the impacts of 
generic dairy advertising by the National Dairy 
Promotion and Research Board on retail, wholesale, and 
farm dairy markets. A disaggregated industry model of 
the retail, wholesale, and farm levels with markets for 
fluid milk, frozen products, cheese, and butter was 
developed to conduct the analysis. An econometric 
model of the dairy industry was estimated using 
quarterly data from 1975 through 1996. The 
econometric results were then used to simulate market
conditions with and without the NDPRB.
The results indicate that NDPRB had a major 
impact on market conditions at all levels of the dairy 
industry, particularly the fluid market. For example, 
over the period 1984-96, on average, the NDPRB had 
the following market impacts compared to what would 
have occurred in the absence of this national program:
An increase in the national farm milk price of 
almost 3 percent and an increase in milk 
production of 0.6 percent.
An increase in dairy producer revenue of 3.5 
percent.
A rate of return of 5.27, i.e., an additional 
dollar invested in generic advertising resulted 
in a return of $5.27 in dairy producer revenue.
“S’ An increase in overall demand for milk of 0.7 
percent, including a 2.1 percent increase in 
fluid milk demand. The NDPRB had virtually 
no impact on cheese, butter, and frozen 
product demand.
An overall increase in retail prices for milk and 
dairy products. The national advertising 
program had the largest effect on increasing 
retail fluid milk prices (11.4 percent). Retail 
frozen product, cheese, and butter prices 
increased by 1.2 percent, 0.4 percent, and 0.5 
percent, respectively, due to NDPRB 
advertising efforts.
•s’ An increase in all wholesale prices for milk 
and dairy products. The national advertising 
program had the largest effect on increasing 
wholesale fluid milk prices (7.7 percent). 
Wholesale frozen product, cheese, and butter 
prices increased by 1.7 percent, 2.6 percent, 
and 0.7 percent, respectively, due to NDPRB 
advertising efforts.
A decrease in government purchases of dairy 
products under the Dairy Price Support 
Program of 1.7 percent.
Consequently, it is clear that dairy farmers 
benefitted from the presence of the NDPRB since farm
2prices and producer revenues were positively impacted. 
Dairy wholesalers and retailers also benefitted from this 
program since prices and sales were positively effected 
by the NDPRB advertising effort. Tax payers also 
benefitted because government purchases and costs of 
the Dairy Price Support Program were lower.
introduction
Dairy farmers pay a mandatory assessment of 15 cents 
per hundred pounds of milk marketed in the continental 
United States to fund a national demand expansion 
program. The aims of this program are to increase 
consumer demand for milk and dairy products, enhance 
dairy farm revenue, and reduce the amount of surplus 
milk purchased by the government under the Dairy 
Price Support Program. Legislative authority for these 
assessments is contained in the Dairy and Tobacco 
Adjustment Act of 1983. To increase milk and dairy 
product consumption, the National Dairy Promotion and 
Research Board (NDPRB) was established to invest in 
generic dairy advertising and promotion, nutrition 
research, education, and new product development.
Each year, the Cornell Commodity Promotion 
Research Program (CCPRP) estimates the impact of the 
NDPRB generic advertising effort on the U.S. dairy 
industry. U.S. dairy industry data are updated each year 
and used with a dairy industry model to measure the 
impact of generic advertising on prices and quantities of 
milk and dairy products. The model used is based on a 
dynamic econometric model of the U.S. dairy industry 
estimated using quarterly data from 1975 through 1996, 
and is unique from previous models of the U.S. dairy 
sector in its level of disaggregation. For instance, the 
dairy industry is divided into retail, wholesale, and farm 
markets, and the retail and wholesale markets separately 
include fluid milk, cheese, butter, and frozen products. 
Econometric results are used to simulate market 
conditions with and without the national program.
The results of this study are important for dairy 
farmers and policy makers alike given the dairy industry 
has the largest generic promotion program of all U.S. 
agricultural commodities. Over $200 million is raised 
annually by the checkoff on dairy farmers, and the 
majority of this is invested in media advertising of milk 
and dairy products. Farmers certainly want to know 
whether their advertising investment is paying off.
Consequently, the annual measurement of generic dairy 
advertising is an important objective of the CCPRP.
Background
Prior to 1984, there was no national mandatory checkoff 
for dairy advertising and promotion. However, many 
states had their own checkoff programs, which were 
primarily used for promoting and advertising fluid milk. 
Because of the huge surplus milk problem which began 
in the early 1980s, Congress passed the Dairy and 
Tobacco Adjustment Act in 1983. This Act was 
designed to reduce milk surplus by implementing a 
voluntary supply control program (Milk Diversion 
Program) and authorizing a mandatory checkoff for 
demand expansion. The mandatory checkoff program, 
which was subsequently approved by dairy farmers in a 
national referendum, resulted in the creation of the 
NDPRB.
The generic advertising effort of the NDPRB 
initially emphasized manufactured dairy products, since 
10 of the 15 cents of the checkoff went to state 
promotion programs which were primarily fluid 
programs. This is evident in Figure 1, which shows 
quarterly generic fluid advertising expenditures in the 
United States from 1975-96, deflated by the media cost 
index. At the national level, generic fluid advertising 
expenditures did not significantly change immediately 
following the creation of the NDPRB. In fact, it was 
not until the mid-1990s that there was a significant 
increase in generic fluid milk advertising expenditures, 
which occurred after the NDPRB merged with the 
United Dairy Industry Association (UDIA). 
Subsequently, the amount of fluid advertising has 
increased significantly.
Figures 2-4 show quarterly generic cheese, 
butter, and frozen dairy product advertising in the 
United States from 1975-96. It is clear from Figures 2­
4 that the NDPRB initially focused on generic 
advertising of manufactured dairy products. Generic 
cheese, butter, and frozen product advertising increased 
substantially after the creation of the NDPRB. 
However, since the mid-1980s, generic advertising of 
these products has been steadily declining in favor of 
generic fluid advertising. This trend is likely due to the 
fact that dairy farmers received a higher price for milk 
going into fluid products. Hence, increasing the
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Figure 4. Deflated generic ice cream advertising expenditures, 1975-96.
Year
19
95
Figure 5. Conceptual overview of U.S dairy industry model.
Farm Milk Supply
8utilization of milk into fluid products is an effective 
way to increase the average farm price.
Conceptual Model
There has been a lot of research on the impacts of 
generic dairy advertising. For example, in an annotated 
bibliography of generic commodity promotion research, 
Ferrero et al. listed 29 economic studies on dairy over 
the period, 1992-96. Some of this research has been at 
the state level with New York state being studied 
extensively (eg-, Kinnucan, Chang, and 
Venkateswaran; Kaiser and Reberte; Reberte et al.). 
These studies have used single equation techniques to 
estimate demand equations, usually for fluid milk, as 
functions of own price, substitute price, income, 
population demographics, and advertising. There have 
been several recent national studies done as well (e.g., 
Blisard and Blaylock; Liu et al. (1990); Comick and 
Cox; Suzuki et al.; Wohlgenant and Clary). Of these, 
the most disaggregated in terms of markets and products 
was Liu et al. (1990), who developed a multiple market, 
multiple product dairy industry model to measure the 
impacts of fluid milk and manufactured dairy product 
generic advertising.
The econometric model presented here is 
similar in structure to the industry model developed by 
Liu et al. (1990, 1991). Both Liu et al. (1990, 1991) 
and the current model are partial equilibrium models of 
the domestic dairy one category (Class III), the present 
model disaggregates manufactured products into three 
classes: frozen products, cheese, and butter. This
greater degree of product disaggregation provides for 
additional insight into the impacts of advertising on 
individual product demand, e.g., cheese, butter, and 
frozen product demand.
In the farm market, Grade A (fluid eligible) 
milk is produced by farmers and sold to wholesalers. 
The wholesale market is disaggregated into four 
submarkets: fluid (beverage) milk, frozen products,
cheese, and butter.1 Wholesalers process the milk into 
these four dairy products and sell them to retailers, who
1 All quantities in the model are expressed on a milkfat 
equivalent (me) basis. Consequently, nonfat dry milk was not 
considered in the model.
then sell the products to consumers. The model 
assumes that farmers, wholesalers, and retailers behave 
competitively in the market. This assumption is 
supported empirically by two recent studies. Liu, Sun, 
and Kaiser estimated the market power of fluid milk 
and manufacturing milk processors, concluding that 
both behaved quite competitively over the period 1982­
1992. Suzuki et al. measured the degree of market 
imperfection in the fluid milk industry and found the 
degree of imperfection to be relatively small and 
declining over time.
It is assumed that the two major federal 
programs regulating the dairy industry (federal milk 
marketing orders and the Dairy Price Support Program) 
are in effect. Since this is a national model, it is 
assumed that there is one federal milk marketing order 
regulating all milk marketed in the nation. The federal 
milk marketing order program is incorporated by 
restricting the prices wholesalers pay for raw milk to be 
the minimum class prices. For example, fluid milk 
wholesalers pay the higher Class I price, while cheese 
wholesalers pay the lower Class III price. The Dairy 
Price Support Program is incorporated into the model 
by restricting the wholesale cheese and butter prices to 
be greater than or equal to the government purchase 
prices for these products. With the government 
offering to buy unlimited quantities of storable 
manufactured dairy products at announced purchase 
prices, the program indirectly supports the farm milk 
price by increasing farm-level milk demand. A 
conceptual overview of the model is presented in 
Figure 5.
Retail markets are defined by sets of supply 
and demand functions, in addition to equilibrium 
conditions that require supply and demand to be equal. 
Since the market is disaggregated into fluid milk, 
frozen products, cheese, and butter, there are four sets 
of these equations, with each set having the following 
general specification:
(1.1) RD = f(RP|Srd),
(1.2) RS = f(RP|Srs),
(1.3) RD = RS = R*,
where: RD and RS are retail demand and supply,
respectively, RP is the retail own price, Sr<^ is a vector 
of retail demand shifters including generic advertising,
9Srs is a vector of retail supply shifters including the 
wholesale own price, and R* is the equilibrium retail 
quantity.
The wholesale market is also defined by four 
sets of supply and demand functions, and equilibrium 
conditions. The wholesale fluid milk and frozen 
product markets have the following general 
specification:
(2.1) WD = R*,
(2.2) WS = f(WP|Sws),
(2.3) WS = WD = W*= R*,
where: WD and WS are wholesale demand and supply,
respectively, WP is the wholesale own price, and Sws is 
a vector of wholesale supply shifters. In the wholesale 
fluid milk supply equation, Sws includes the Class I 
price, which is equal to the Class III milk price (i.e., the 
Basic Formula price) plus a fixed fluid milk differential. 
In the frozen products, cheese, and butter wholesale 
supply functions, Sws includes the Class III price, 
which is the most important variable cost to dairy 
processors. Note that the wholesale level demand 
functions do not have to be estimated since the 
equilibrium conditions constrain wholesale demand to 
be equal to the equilibrium retail quantity. The 
assumption that wholesale demand equals retail quantity 
implies a fixed-proportions production technology.
The direct impacts of the Dairy Price Support 
Program occur at the wholesale cheese and butter 
market levels. It is at this level that the Commodity 
Credit Corporation (CCC) provides an alternative 
source of demand at announced purchase prices. In 
addition, cheese and butter can be stored as inventories, 
which represent another source of demand not present 
with the other two products. Consequently, the 
equilibrium conditions for the butter and cheese 
wholesale markets are different than those for the fluid 
milk and frozen wholesale markets. The wholesale 
cheese and butter markets have the following general 
specification:
(3.1) WD = R*,
(3.2) WS = f(WP|Sws),
(3.3) WS = WD + AINV + QSP = Qw,
where: WD and WS are wholesale demand and supply, 
respectively, WS is the wholesale own price, Sws is a 
vector of wholesale supply shifters including the Class 
III milk price, AINV is change in commercial 
inventories, QSP is quantity of product sold by 
specialty plants to the government, and Qw is the 
equilibrium wholesale quantity. The variables AINV 
and QSP represent a small proportion of total milk 
production and are assumed to be exogenous in this 
model.2
The Dairy Price Support Program is 
incorporated in the model by constraining the 
wholesale cheese and butter prices to be not less than 
their respective government purchase prices, i.e.,:
(4.1) WCP > GCP,
(4.2) WBP > GBP,
where: WCP and GCP are the wholesale and
government purchase prices for cheese, respectively, 
and WBP and GBP are the wholesale and government 
purchase prices for butter, respectively.
Because of the Dairy Price Support Program, 
four regimes are possible: (1) WCP > GCP and WBP > 
GBP; (2) WCP > GCP and WBP = GBP; (3) WCP = 
GCP and WBP > GBP; or (4) WCP = GCP and WBP 
= GBP. In the cheese and butter markets, specific 
versions of equilibrium condition (3.3) are applicable to 
the first regime, which is the competitive case. In the 
second case, where the cheese market is competitive 
but the butter market is not, the wholesale butter price
2
Certain cheese and butter plants sell products to the 
government only, regardless of the relationship between the 
wholesale market price and the purchase price. These are 
general balancing plants that remove excess milk from the 
market when supply is greater than demand, and process the 
milk into cheese and butter which is then sold to the 
government. Because of this, the quantity of milk purchased by 
the government was disaggregated into purchases from these 
specialized plants and other purchases. In a competitive regime, 
the "other purchases" are expected to be zero, while the 
purchases from specialty plants may be positive. The QSPC and 
QSPb variables were determined by computing the average 
amount of government purchases of cheese and butter during 
competitive periods, i.e., when the wholesale price was greater 
than the purchase price for these two products.
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is set equal to the government purchase price for butter 
and the equilibrium condition is changed to:
(3.3b) WBS = WBD + AINVb + QSPb + GB = WB,
where: GB is government purchases of butter which 
becomes the new endogenous variable, replacing the 
wholesale butter price. For the third case, where the 
butter market is competitive but the cheese market is 
not, the wholesale cheese price is set equal to the 
government purchase price for cheese and the 
equilibrium condition is changed to:
(3.3c) WCS = WCD + AINVC + QSPC + GC = WC,
where: GC is government purchases of cheese, which 
becomes the new endogenous variable replacing the 
wholesale cheese price. Finally, for the last case where 
both the cheese and the butter markets are not 
competitive, the wholesale cheese and butter prices are 
set equal to their respective government purchase prices 
and the equilibrium conditions are changed to (3.3b) 
and (3.3c).3
The farm raw milk market is represented by 
the following milk supply equation:
(5.1) FMS = f(E[AMP]|Sfm),
where: FMS is commercial milk marketings in the
United States, E[AMP] is the expected all milk price, 
Sfm is a vector of milk supply shifters. As in the model 
developed by LaFrance and de Gorter, and by Kaiser, a 
perfect foresight specification is used for the expected 
farm milk price.
The farm milk price is a weighted average of 
the class prices for milk, with the weights equal to the 
utilization of milk among products:
3 Because the market structure is different under each of these 
four regimes, using conventional two-stage least squares to 
estimate equations (1.1) through (4.2) may result in selectivity 
bias. Theoretically, a switching simultaneous system regression 
procedure should be applied (see Liu et al. (1990, 1991)). This 
procedure was not used here because it was beyond the scope of 
the project. Applying it to the level of disaggregation of this 
model’s manufactured product market would have been 
extremely cumbersome, and the costs of doing so were judged 
to be greater than the potential benefits.
(5.2) AMP = 1P3 + dl WFS + P3 (WFZS + WCS + WBS!
WFS + WFZS + WCS + WBS
where: P3 is the Class III price, d is the Class I fixed 
fluid milk differential (therefore the Class I price is 
equal to P3 + d), WFS is wholesale fluid milk supply, 
WFZS is wholesale frozen product supply, WCS is 
wholesale cheese supply, and WBS is wholesale butter 
supply.
Finally, the model is closed by the following 
equilibrium condition:
(5.3) FMS = WFS + WFZS + WCS + WBS + FUSE +
OTHER,
where FUSE is on-farm use of milk and OTHER is 
milk used in dairy products other than fluid milk, 
frozen products, butter, and cheese. Both of these 
variables represent a small share of total milk 
production and were treated as exogenous.
Econometric Estimation
The equations were estimated simultaneously using an 
instrumental variable approach for all prices and 
quarterly data from 1975 through 1996. Specifically, 
all prices were regressed using ordinary least squares 
on the exogenous variables in the model, and the 
resulting fitted values were used as instrumental price 
variables in the structural equations. The econometric 
package used was EViews (Hall, Lilien, and Johnston). 
All equations in the model were specified in double­
logarithm functional form. Variable definitions, data 
sources, and estimation results are presented in the 
Appendix. In terms of statistical fit, most of the 
estimated equations were found to be reasonable with 
respect to R^. In all but two equations the adjusted 
coefficient of determination was above 0.89. The two 
equations that were the most difficult to estimate were 
the retail butter demand and supply equations, which 
had the lowest (0.55 and 0.55, respectively).
The retail market demand functions were 
estimated on a per capita basis. Retail demand for each 
product was specified to be a function of the following 
variables: 1) retail product price, 2) price of
substitutes, 3) per capita disposable income, 4) 
quarterly dummy variables to account for seasonal
11
demand, 5) a time trend variable to capture changes in 
consumer tastes and preferences over time,4 6) a dummy 
variable for the quarters that bovine somatotropin was 
approved, and 7) generic advertising expenditures to 
measure the impact of advertising on retail demand. In 
all demand functions, own prices and income were 
deflated by a substitute product price index. This 
specification was followed because there was strong 
correlation between the substitute price and own price 
for each dairy product. The consumer price index for 
nonalcoholic beverages was used as the substitute price 
in the fluid milk demand equation, the consumer price 
index for meat was used as the substitute price in the 
cheese demand equation, the consumer price index for 
fat was used as the substitute price in the butter demand 
equation, and the consumer price index for food was 
used as the substitute price in the frozen product 
demand equations. To measure the advertising effort of 
the NDPRB, generic advertising expenditures for fluid 
milk and cheese were included as explanatory variables 
in the two respective demand equations.5 Generic 
advertising expenditures for butter and frozen products 
were not included for two reasons. First, the NDPRB 
has not invested much money into advertising these two 
products. Second, including generic butter and frozen 
product advertising expenditures in an earlier version of 
the model resulted in highly statistically insignificant 
estimated coefficients. Branded advertising
expenditures were also included in the fluid milk and 
cheese demand equations, but not the butter and frozen 
dairy product demand equations for reasons similar to 
those cited for not including generic butter and frozen 
product advertising.
To capture the dynamics of advertising, 
generic advertising expenditures were specified as a 
second-order polynomial distributed lag. The length of 
the lag was initially varied between one and six quarters 
and the final specification was chosen based on 
goodness of fit. Finally, a first-order moving average 
error structure was imposed on the retail fluid milk
4 Several functional forms were specified for the time trend, 
including linear, log linear, and exponential forms. The form 
yielding the best statistical results was chosen for each equation.
5 All generic and branded advertising expenditures came from 
various issues of Leading National Advertisers.
demand equation, a first-order autoregressive error 
structure was imposed on the retail cheese demand 
equation, and a second-order autoregressive error 
structure was imposed on the retail butter and frozen 
product demand equations to correct for 
autocorrelation.
Based on the econometric estimation, generic 
fluid milk advertising had the largest long-run 
advertising elasticity of 0.039 and was statistically 
different from zero at the 1 percent significance level. 
This means a 1 percent increase in generic fluid 
advertising expenditures resulted in a 0.039 percent 
increase in fluid demand on average over this period, 
which is higher than previous results. For example, 
based on a similar model with data from 1975-95, 
Kaiser estimated a long-run elasticity of 0.021 for 
generic milk advertising. Other studies have found 
comparable estimates, e.g., Kinnucan estimated a long- 
run fluid milk advertising elasticity of 0.051 for New 
York City; and Kinnucan, Chang, and Venkateswaran 
estimated a long-run fluid milk advertising elasticity of 
0.016 for New York City. Generic cheese advertising 
was also positive and statistically significant from zero 
at the 1 percent significance level and had a long-run 
advertising elasticity of 0.010, which is slightly lower 
than the previous estimate of 0.016 by Kaiser.
The retail supply for each product was 
estimated as a function of the following variables: 1) 
retail price, 2) wholesale price (representing major 
variable costs to retailers), 3) producer price index for 
fuel and energy, 4) average hourly wage in the food 
manufacturing sector, 5) time trend variable, 6) 
quarterly dummy variables, and 7) lagged retail supply. 
The producer price index for fuel and energy was used 
as a proxy for variable energy costs, while the average 
hourly wage was used to capture labor costs in the retail 
supply functions. All prices and costs were deflated by 
the wholesale product price associated with each 
equation. The quarterly dummy variables were 
included to capture seasonality in retail supply, while 
the lagged supply variables were incorporated to 
represent capacity constraints. The time trend variable 
was included as a proxy for technological change in 
retailing. Not all of these variables remained in each of 
the final estimated retail supply equations due to 
statistical significance and/or wrong sign on the 
coefficient. Finally, a first-order autoregressive error
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structure was imposed on the retail frozen product 
supply equation, a second-order autoregressive error 
structure was imposed on the retail cheese supply 
equation, and a third-order autoregressive error 
structure was imposed on the retail fluid milk supply 
equation.
The wholesale supply for each product was 
estimated as a function of the following variables: 1) 
wholesale price, 2) the appropriate class price for milk, 
which represents the main variable cost to wholesalers, 
3) producer price index for fuel and energy, 4) average 
hourly wage in the food manufacturing sector, 5) time 
trend variable, 6) quarterly dummy variables, 7) lagged 
wholesale supply, and 8) two dummy variables for the 
cheese and butter demand functions corresponding to 
the Milk Diversion and Dairy Termination Programs, 
which were two supply control programs implemented 
over part of this period. The producer price index for 
fuel and energy was included because energy costs are 
important variable costs to wholesalers, while the 
average hourly wage was used to capture labor costs in 
the wholesale supply functions. All prices and costs 
were deflated by the price of farm milk, i.e., class price. 
The quarterly dummy variables were used to capture 
seasonality in wholesale supply, lagged wholesale 
supply was included to reflect capacity constraints, and 
the trend variable was incorporated as a measure of 
technological change in dairy product processing. Not 
all of these variables remained in each of the final 
estimated wholesale supply equations due to statistical 
significance and/or wrong sign on the coefficient. 
Finally, a first-order autoregressive error structure was 
imposed on the wholesale fluid milk and frozen product 
supply equations.
For the farm milk market, the farm milk supply 
was estimated as a function of the following variables: 
1) ratio of the farm milk price to feed ration costs, 2) 
ratio of the price of slaughter cows to feed ration costs, 
3) lagged milk supply, 4) intercept dummy variables to 
account for the quarters that the Milk Diversion and 
Dairy Termination Programs were in effect, 5) quarterly 
dummy variables, and 6) time trend variable. Feed 
ration costs represent the most important variable costs 
in milk production, while the price of slaughtered cows 
represents an important opportunity cost to dairy 
farmers. Lagged milk supply was included as 
biological capacity constraints to current milk supply.
Market Impacts of the NDPRB
To examine the impacts that the NDPRB had on the 
market over the period 1984.3-1996.4, the model was 
simulated under two scenarios based on generic 
advertising expenditures: 1) historic scenario, where
advertising levels were equal to actual generic 
advertising expenditures, and 2) no-NDPRB scenario, 
where quarterly values of generic advertising 
expenditures were equal to quarterly levels for the year 
prior to the adoption of the NDPRB, i.e., 1983.3-1984.2 
(note that as previously mentioned, there was generic 
dairy advertising prior to the enactment of the NDPRB 
at the state level). A comparison of these two scenarios 
provides a measure of the impacts of the NDPRB on 
dairy markets. Table 1 presents the quarterly averages 
of price and quantity variables for the period, 1984.3­
96.4.
It is clear from these results that the NDPRB 
had an impact on the dairy market for the period 
1984.3-96.4. The generic advertising effort of the 
NDPRB resulted in a 2.14 percent increase in fluid 
sales and a 11.36 percent increase in retail fluid price 
compared to what would have occurred in the absence 
of this national program. Note that since the own price 
elasticity of fluid milk demand was estimated to be 
quite inelastic (-0.1), the modest increase in fluid sales 
due to advertising caused a sizable increase in price. 
The increase in fluid sales also caused the wholesale 
fluid price to increase by 7.74 percent.
Generic advertising by the NDPRB resulted in 
a 0.73 percent increase in the overall demand for milk 
used in all dairy products compared to what would have 
occurred in the absence of this national program. It is 
interesting that the entire increase in dairy consumption 
from generic dairy advertising was due to increases in 
fluid milk demand. In fact, demand for cheese, butter, 
and frozen dairy products was marginally lower in the 
NDPRB scenario. This is due to the impact that higher 
generic dairy advertising had on retail prices, which 
were higher for all products in the NDPRB scenario 
because the overall demand for milk used in all 
products was higher. The net result was that the 
negative effect of higher retail prices outweighed the 
positive effect of advertising on the demand for cheese, 
butter, and frozen products. Specifically, the increase 
in advertising expenditures due to the NDPRB resulted
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Table 1. Simulated quarterly values for market variables with and without the NDPRB, averaged over 1984.3-96.4.
Variable Unit
1984.3-96.4 Average 
with without 
NDPRB NDPRB
Percent
change
Confidence interval 
Low High 
bound bound 
(percent) (percent)
Fluid demand/supply bil lbs me* 13.53 13.24 2.14 0.71 3.79
Frozen demand/supply bil lbs me 3.15 3.16 -0.27 -0.07 -0.59
Cheese demand bil lbs me 13.15 13.17 -0.14 -0.04 0.11
Cheese supply bil lbs me 13.19 13.20 -0.10 -0.10 0.12
Butter demand bil lbs me 5.37 5.37 -0.11 -0.03 -0.28
Butter supply bil lbs me 6.58 6.61 -0.49 -0.13 -0.99
Total demand bil lbs me 35.20 34.94 0.73 0.22 1.51
Retail fluid price 1982-84=100 131.25 116.34 11.36 3.97 19.77
Retail frozen price 1982-84=100 136.50 134.82 1.23 0.33 2.57
Retail cheese price 1982-84=100 137.73 137.26 0.35 0.07 1.41
Retail butter price 1982-84=100 99.28 98.83 0.46 0.10 1.22
Wholesale fluid price 1982=100 131.44 121.27 7.74 2.56 14.21
Wholesale frozen price 1982=100 133.97 131.71 1.68 0.45 3.49
Wholesale cheese price $/lb 1.63 1.59 2.61 0.73 5.14
Wholesale butter price $/lb 1.10 1.10 0.67 0.13 1.93
Class III price $/cwt 14.22 13.79 2.98 0.80 6.10
All milk price $/cwt 15.15 14.71 2.89 0.79 5.92
CCC cheese purchases bil lbs me 0.04 0.03 12.48 3.67 63.90
CCC butter purchases bil lbs me 1.23 1.25 -2.14 -0.52 -5.13
CCC purchases bil lbs me 1.26 1.28 -1.72 -0.95 -4.90
Milk supply bil lbs 37.15 36.92 0.63 0.17 1.34
Producer surplus bil $ 5.22 5.03 3.54 0.96 7.25
Rate of return $ 5.27 1.23 14.91
* The notation “me" stands for milk equivalent.
in a 0.35 percent, 0.46 percent, and 1.23 percent 
increase in retail cheese, butter, and frozen product 
prices, respectively, and a 0.14 percent, 0.11 percent, 
and 0.27 percent decrease in retail cheese, butter, and 
frozen product sales, respectively. Wholesale cheese, 
butter, and frozen product prices were 2.61 percent, 
0.67 percent, and 1.68 percent higher, respectively, due 
to the NDPRB advertising effort.
Cheese and butter supplies were marginally 
lower due to the NDPRB advertising effort. Cheese 
supply, on average, was 0.10 percent lower, while butter
supply was 0.49 percent lower. This was due to the fact 
that the increase in generic advertising under the 
NDPRB scenario resulted in higher raw milk costs (see 
discussion below) to dairy processors, and the net 
impact was a slight reduction in cheese and butter 
supply.
The NDPRB also had an impact on purchases 
of cheese and butter by the government. The decrease 
in cheese demand due to NDPRB advertising was larger 
than the decrease in cheese supply, which resulted in a 
12.48 percent increase in cheese purchased by the
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government, on average, over this period. While this 
increase is significant in percentage terms, it is very 
small in actual magnitude, averaging less than 10 
million pounds per quarter. While butter demand was 
slightly lower (0.11 percent), the 0.49 percent decrease 
in butter supply due to generic advertising by the 
NDPRB caused butter purchases by the government to 
decrease by 2.14 percent, on average, over the period. 
Total dairy product purchases by the government were 
1.72 percent lower in the NDPRB scenario.
The introduction of the NDPRB also had an 
impact on the farm market over this period. The Class 
III and farm milk prices increased by 2.98 percent and 
2.89 percent under the national program due to an 
increase of 0.73 percent in total milk demand. Farm 
supply, in turn, increased by 0.63 percent. Farmers 
were better off under the NDPRB since producer 
surplus averaged 3.54 percent higher with the program. 
One bottom-line measure of the net benefits of the 
NDPRB to farmers is the rate of return, which gives the 
ratio of benefits to costs of the national program. 
Specifically, this rate of return measure was calculated 
as the change in producer surplus, due to the NDPRB, 
divided by the costs of funding this program. The cost 
of the program was measured as the 15 cents per 
hundredweight assessment times total milk marketings. 
In the year prior to the program, farmers voluntarily 
contributed 6.3 cents per hundredweight. Therefore, the 
difference in cost due to the national checkoff was 
assumed to be the difference between 0.0015 times milk 
marketings (in billion pounds) under the NDPRB 
scenario minus 0.00063 times milk marketings under 
the no-NDPRB scenario. The results showed that the 
rate of return from the NDPRB was 5.27 over this 
period. This means that an additional dollar invested in 
generic advertising would return $5.27 in profits to 
farmers. The farm level rate of return was higher than 
estimates of 4.77 by Liu et al. (1990) for the period 
1975.1 through 1987.4, 4.60 by Kaiser and Forker for 
the period 1975.1 through 1990.4, and 3.40 for the 
period 1975.1 through 1995.3 by Kaiser.
Because there is some error associated with 
any statistical estimation, a 95 percent confidence 
interval was calculated for these impacts. The 95 
percent confidence interval provides a lower and upper 
bounds where each of these random variables should be 
95 percent of the time. The lower and upper bounds for
each market variable were estimated by resimulating the 
two scenarios by setting the fluid milk and cheese 
advertising coefficients in the retail demand equations 
to the lower and upper bounds of a 95 percent 
confidence interval. The estimated lower and upper 
limits of the 95 percent confidence interval for all 
variables are presented in the last two columns of Table 
1. As an example of the interpretation of this, consider 
the impact of the NDPRB on fluid demand. As 
mentioned above, the average impact of NDPRB 
advertising was a 2.14 percent increase in fluid milk 
demand. The 95 percent confidence interval 
demonstrates that one can be “confident” 95 percent of 
the time that the impact of NDPRB advertising on fluid 
milk demand lies between 0.71 percent, on the low side, 
and 3.79 percent, on the high side. The lower and upper 
limits of the 95 percent confidence interval for the rate 
of return are 1.23 and 14.91, respectively. Since even 
the low bound of this confidence interval is above 1.0, 
this provides substantial evidence that the benefits of 
generic advertising are larger than the costs.
Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to analyze the impacts of 
generic dairy advertising by the National Dairy 
Promotion and Research Board on retail, wholesale, and 
farm dairy markets. The results indicated that the 
NDPRB had a major impact on retail, wholesale, and 
farm markets for the dairy industry. The main 
conclusion of the study is that farmers are receiving a 
high return on their investment in generic dairy 
advertising.
Given the current legal debate over mandatory 
commodity checkoff programs, evidence from this 
study can be used to demonstrate that generic 
advertising does have a significant impact on the 
market. The impacts of advertising tend to be more 
profound in increasing price than quantity, which is due 
to the inelastic nature of demand for milk and cheese. 
These estimated impacts need to be compared with 
other options producers have for marketing their 
product (e.g., nonadvertising promotion, research, new 
product development, etc.) in order to determine the 
optimality of the current investment of advertising. 
Consequently, these results should be viewed as a first 
step in the evaluation process.
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While there are advantages to the industry 
model used in this study, there are also some 
shortcomings that need to be pointed out. One 
limitation is that advertising impacts may be overstated 
due to the assumption of fixed proportions. As 
Kinnucan pointed out, the fixed proportions assumption 
does not allow for input substitution, which may cause 
derived-demand elasticities for farm output to be 
understated and profits from advertising to be 
overstated. Another limitation is that the model did not 
include several other activities of the NDPRB such as 
nonadvertising promotion and research. While 
advertising is by far the largest investment by the 
NDPRB, these other activities may also have an impact 
on demand for milk and dairy products. Unfortunately, 
these data could not be obtained for this study.
There are two directions that could be useful 
for future research. Obviously, inclusion of other 
marketing activities by the NDPRB would be useful 
because the model could then be used to determine the 
optimal allocation of dairy farmer checkoff funds across 
marketing activities. In addition, spatial disaggregation 
of the model into several regions of the United States, 
particularly for fluid milk, would be valuable. 
Although manufactured dairy products are well- 
represented as a national market, fluid milk markets 
tend to be regional in scope, and fluid milk marketing 
orders cause different price surfaces for fluid milk. 
Regional disaggregation of fluid milk markets would 
also make the model a valuable tool in examining dairy 
policy questions on such issues as federal milk 
marketing order consolidation.
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Appendix
This appendix contains the estimated econometric model of the U.S. dairy industry. Appendix Table 1 provides the 
variable definitions and data sources. This is followed by the 13 estimated equations.
Appendix Table 1. Variable definitions and sources.*
RFD = per capita retail fluid milk demand (milkfat equivalent basis), from Dairy Situation and Outlook.
RFPBEV = consumer retail price index for fresh milk and cream (1982-84 = 100), divided by consumer retail pric< 
index for nonalcoholic beverages, both indices from Consumer Price Index.
INCBEV = per capita disposable personal income (in $1,000), from Employment and Earnings, divided by 
consumer retail price index for nonalcoholic beverages,
T = time trend variable for the retail and wholesale-level equations, equal to 1 for 1975.1,....,
BST = intercept dummy variable for bovine somatotropin, equal to 1 for 1994.1 through 1996.4; equal to 0 
otherwise,
DUMQ1 = intercept dummy variable for first quarter of year,
DUMQ2 = intercept dummy variable for second quarter of year,
DUMQ3 = intercept dummy variable for third quarter of year,
GFAD = generic fluid milk advertising expenditures (in $1,000), deflated by the media price index, from 
Leading National Advertisers.
BFAD = branded fluid milk advertising expenditures (in $1,000), deflated by the media price index, from 
Leading National Advertisers.
MA(1) = moving average 1 error correction term,
RCD = per capita retail cheese demand (milkfat equivalent basis), computed as commercial cheese production 
minus government cheese purchases by the Commodity Credit Corporation minus changes in commercial 
cheese inventories (from Cold Storage!.
RCPMEA = consumer retail price index for cheese (1982-84 = 100), divided by consumer retail price index for 
fat (1982-84 = 100), both indices from Consumer Price Index.
TSQ = time trend squared,
GCAD = = generic cheese advertising expenditures (in $1,000), deflated by the media price index, from Leading 
National Advertisers.
BCAD = branded cheese advertising expenditures (in $1,000), deflated by the media price index, from Leading 
National Advertisers.
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Appendix Table 1. Variable definitions and sources-continued.
AR(1) = AR 1 error correction term,
AR(2) = AR 2 error correction term,
AR(3) = AR 3 error correction term,
RBD = per capita retail butter demand (milkfat equivalent basis), computed as commercial butter production 
minus government butter purchases by the Commodity Credit Corporation minus changes in commercial 
butter inventories (from Cold Storage-).
RBPFAT = consumer retail price index for butter (1982-84 = 100), divided by consumer retail price index for fat 
(1982-84 = 100), both indices from Consumer Price Index.
RFZD = per capita retail frozen dairy product demand (milkfat equivalent basis), from Dairy Products Annual 
Summary.
RFZPFOO = consumer retail price index for frozen dairy products (1982-84 = 100), divided by consumer retail 
price index for food (1982-84 = 100), both indices from Consumer Price Index.
RFS = retail fluid milk supply (bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent), RFS=RFD*POP (where POP = U.S. civilian 
population),
RFPWFP = consumer retail price index for fresh milk and cream, divided by wholesale fluid milk price index 
(1982 = 100) from Producer Price Index.
PFEWFP = producer price index for fuel and energy (1967 = 100), from Producer Price Index, divided by 
wholesale fluid milk price index,
RCS = retail cheese supply (bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent), RCS=RCD*POP,
RCPWCP = consumer retail price index for cheese, divided by wholesale cheese price ($/lb.) from Dairy Situation 
and Outlook.
PFEWCP = producer price index for fuel and energy (1967 = 100), from Producer Price Index, divided by 
wholesale cheese price,
RBS = retail butter supply (bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent), RBS=RBD*POP,
RBPWBP = consumer retail price index for butter, divided by wholesale butter price ($/lb.), from Dairy Situation 
and Outlook.
PFEWBP = producer price index for fuel and energy, divided by wholesale butter price,
RFZS = retail frozen dairy product supply (bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent), RFZS=RFZD*POP,
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Appendix Table 1. Variable definitions and sources—continued.
RFZPWFZP = consumer retail price index for frozen dairy products, divided by wholesale frozen dairy products 
price index (1982 = 100), from Producer Price Index.
WFS = wholesale fluid milk supply (bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent), WFS = RFS = RFD*POP,
WFPP1 = wholesale fluid milk price index, divided by Class I price for raw milk ($/cwt.), from Federal Milk 
Order Market Statistics.
PFEP1 = producer price index for fuel and energy, divided by Class I price for raw milk,
WCS = wholesale cheese production (bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent), from Dairy Products Annual Summary.
WCPP3 = wholesale cheese price, divided by Class III price for raw milk ($/cwt.) from Federal Milk Order 
Market Statistics.
MWAGEP3 = average hourly wage in manufacture sector ($/hr.) from Handbook of Basic Economic Statistics. 
divided by Class III price for raw milk,
MDP = intercept dummy variable for the Milk Diversion Program equal to 1 for 1984.1 through 1985.2; equal to 
0 otherwise,
DTP = intercept dummy variable for the Dairy Termination Program equal to 1 for 1986.2 through 1987.3; equal 
to 0 otherwise,
WBS = wholesale butter production (bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent), from Dairy Products Annual Summary. 
WBPP3 = wholesale butter price, divided by Class III price for raw milk,
WFZS = wholesale frozen dairy product production (bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent), from Dairy Products 
Annual Summary.
WFZPP3 = wholesale frozen dairy product price divided by Class III price for raw milk,
FMS = U.S. milk production (bil. lbs.), from Dairy Situation and Outlook.
AMPPFEED = U.S. average all milk price ($/cwt.), divided by the U.S. average dairy ration cost ($/cwt.), both 
from Dairy Situation and Outlook.
PCOWPFEED = U.S. average slaughter cow price ($/cwt.) from Dairy Situation and Outlook, divided by U.S. 
average dairy ration cost.
*An "L” in front of a variable means the variable has been transformed into natural logarithm.
LS // Dependent Variable is LRFD
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Prob.
C -2.871807 0.239295 -12.00112 0.0000
LRFPBEV -0.100921 0.053862 -1.873704 0.0653
LINCBEV 0.090514 0.054206 1.669808 0.0996
LT -0.056140 0.016279 -3.448671 0.0010
DUMQ1 -0.011224 0.003562 -3.150695 0.0024
DUMQ2 -0.059950 0.004307 -13.91878 0.0000
DUMQ3 -0.052261 0.003392 -15.40538 0.0000
BST -0.051310 0.007657 -6.701083 '  0.0000
PDL01 0.006872 0.002264 3.034738 0.0034
PDL02 0.001546 0.001227 1.260617 0.2118
PDL03 -0.000359 0.000730 -0.491949 0.6244
PDL04 0.001064 0.001764 0.602932 0.5486
PDL05 0.000517 0.000557 0.927862 0.3568
PDL06 0.000220 0.000363 0.607550 0.5455
MA(1) 0.371090 0.117050 3.170359 0.0023
R-squared 0.922333 Mean dependent var -2.904816
Adjusted R-squared 0.906104 S.D. dependent var 0.040378
S.E. of regression 0.012373 Akaike info criterion -8.620690
Sum squared resid 0.010257 Schwartz criterion -8.180436
Log likelihood 252.0953 F-statistic 56.83272
Durbin-Watson stat 1.806135 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Lag Distribution of LGFAD i Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic
0 0.00234 0.00367 0.63803
1 0.00497 0.00189 2.62739
2 0.00687 0.00226 3.03474
3 0.00806 0.00227 3.54360
4 0.00853 0.00188 4.54444
5 0.00828 0.00357 2.31590
Sum of Lags 0.03905 0.00662 5.90012
Lag Distribution of LBFAD i Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic
0 0.00150 0.00291 0.51492
1 0.00091 0.00165 0.55193
2 0.00077 0.00160 0.47839
3 0.00106 0.00176 0.60293
4 0.00180 0.00162 1.10926
5 0.00298 0.00161 1.85267
6 0.00460 0.00275 1.67186
Sum of Lags 0.01361 0.00833 1.63469
LS // Dependent Variable is LRCD
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Prob.
C -3.011266 0.261707 -11.50627 0.0000
LRCPMEA -0.548984 0.131665 -4.169541 0.0001
LINCMEA 0.280907 0.091691 3.063612 0.0031
TSQ 6.62E-05 5.84E-06 11.34200 0.0000
DUMQ1 -0.096986 0.009122 -10.63258 0.0000
DUMQ2 -0.061768 0.008795 -7.023239 0.0000
DLIMQ3 -0.055047 0.008500 -6.476376 0.0000
BST -0.073228 0.018913 -3.871774 0.0002
PDL01 0.002518 0.004356 0.578042 0.5651
PDL02 0.005402 0.003484 1.550448 0.1256
PDL03 0.001400 0.005227 0.267818 0.7896
PDL04 0.016544 0.010902 1.517558 0.1337
PDL05 -0.012654 0.007714 -1.640437 0.1055
PDL06 -0.008794 0.013264 -0.663022 0.5095
AR(1) 0.304390 0.113387 2.684515 0.0091
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
S.E. of regression 
Sum squared resid 
Log likelihood 
Durbin-Watson stat
0.984422
0.981261
0.026654
0.049019
193.5561
2.103089
Mean dependent var 
S.D. dependent var 
Akaike info criterion 
Schwartz criterion 
F-statistic 
Prob(F-statistic)
-3.131654
0.194707
-7.089214
-6.655139
311.4421
0.000000
Inverted AR Roots .30
Lag Distribution of LGCAD i Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic
0 -0.00148 0.00445 -0.33332
1 0.00252 0.00436 0.57804
2 0.00932 0.00430 2.16605
Sum of Lags 0.01035 0.00667 1.55317
Lag Distribution of LBCAD i Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic
0 0.02040 0.01020 2.00022
1 0.01654 0.01090 1.51756
2 -0.00490 0.01091 -0.44959
Sum of Lags 0.03204 0.01780 1.80018
LS // Dependent Variable is LRBD
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Prob.
C -2.739390 0.790682 -3.464591 0.0009
LRBPFAT -0.256732 0.103254 -2.486411 0.0151
LINCFAT 0.378281 0.317435 1.191682 0.2371
T -0.005243 0.002613 -2.006518 0.0484
DUMQ1 -0.182247 0.030470 -5.981206 0.0000
DUMQ2 -0.217205 0.036469 -5.955851 0.0000
DUMQ3 -0.138034 0.029897 -4.617040 0.0000
BST 0.184611 0.033782 5.464855 0.0000
AR(2) -0.249045 0.113612 -2.192053 0.0315
R-squared 0.590719 Mean dependent var -3.861517
Adjusted R-squared 0.547062 S.D. dependent var 0.132546
S.E. of regression 0.089204 Akaike info criterion -4.732694
Sum squared resid 0.596806 Schwartz criterion -4.472249
Log likelihood 88.58231 F-statistic 13.53100
Durbin-Watson stat 2.289630 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
LS // Dependent Variable is LRFZD
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Prob.
C -2.785943 0.333995 -8.341274 0.0000
LRFZPFOO -0.225646 0.304868 -0.740143 0.4615
LINCFOO 0.744128 0.144757 5.140544 0.0000
TSQ -6.37E-05 1.04E-05 -6.106981 0.0000
DUMQ1 0.070795 0.014877 4.758519 0.0000
DUMQ2 0.319938 0.013234 24.17537 0.0000
DUMQ3 0.352085 0.014790 23.80630 0.0000
BST 0.106977 0.027361 3.909860 0.0002
AR(2) 0.103661 0.070693 1.466363 0.1467
R-squared 0.927950 Mean dependent var -4.357732
Adjusted R-squared 0.920264 S.D. dependent var 0.164353
S.E. of regression 0.046409 Akaike info criterion -6.039554
Sum squared resid 0.161537 Schwartz criterion -5.779109
Log likelihood 143.4704 F-statistic 120.7421
Durbin-Watson stat 1.834851 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Inverted AR Roots .32 -.32
LS // Dependent Variable is LRFS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Prob.
C 0.856108 0.213876 4.002824 0.0001
LRFPWFP 0.120637 0.086399 1.396270 0.1668
LPFEWFP -0.042471 0.018295 -2.321459 0.0230
LRFS(-1) 0.655147 0.092352 7.094019 0.0000
LT 0.018650 0.005909 3.156064 0.0023
DUMQ1 -0.047818 0.005857 -8.164565 0.0000
DUMQ2 -0.085686 0.005095 -16.81703 0.0000
DUMQ3 -0.048021 0.003315 -14.48424 0.0000
AR(3) 0.185019 0.091938 2.012425 0.0478
R-squared 0.954135 Mean dependent var 2.582295
Adjusted R-squared 0.949243 S.D. dependent var 0.050497
S.E. of regression 0.011377 Akaike info criterion -8.851435
Sum squared resid 0.009707 Schwartz criterion -8.590990
Log likelihood 261.5694 F-statistic 195.0300
Durbin-Watson stat 2.326751 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Inverted AR Roots .57 -,28+.49i -.28 -,49i
LS // Dependent Variable is LRCS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Prob.
C 0.352083 0.236779 1.486973 0.1412
LRCPWCP 0.299389 0.066563 4.497841 0.0000
LPFEWCP -0.229349 0.051099 -4.488346 0.0000
LRCS(-1) 0.471731 0.096253 4.900960 0.0000
LT 0.158882 0.035829 4.434504 0.0000
DLIMQ1 -0.119556 0.011018 -10.85134 0.0000
DUMQ2 -0.034945 0.008518 -4.102575 0.0001
DUMQ3 -0.052006 0.009877 -5.265227 0.0000
AR(2) 0.250109 0.118742 2.106328 0.0385
R-squared 0.987707 Mean dependent var 2.353754
Adjusted R-squared 0.986396 S.D. dependentvar 0.252262
S.E. of regression 0.029423 Akaike info criterion -6.950986
Sum squared resid 0.064929 Schwartz criterion -6.690541
Log likelihood 181.7506 F-statistic 753.2492
Durbin-Watson stat 2.001718 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Inverted AR Roots .50 -.50
LS // Dependent Variable is LRBS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Prob.
C -0.242336 0.478173 -0.506796 0.6138
LRBPWBP 0.424569 0.145951 2.908988 0.0048
LPFEWBP -0.016650 0.085206 -0.195414 0.8456
LRBS(-1) 0.165344 0.105965 1.560361 0.1228
DUMQ1 -0.217661 0.034230 -6.358798 0.0000
DLIMQ2 -0.207004 0.031268 -6.620315 0.0000
DUMQ3 -0.119315 0.031857 -3.745389 0.0003
T -0.001202 0.001213 -0.991395 0.3246
R-squared 0.588627 Mean dependent var 1.623890
Adjusted R-squared 0.550738 S.D. dependentvar 0.149612
S.E. of regression 0.100281 Akaike info criterion -4.509175
Sum squared resid 0.764270 Schwartz criterion -4.277669
Log likelihood 78.19451 F-statistic 15.53533
Durbin-Watson stat 2.031450 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
27
LS // Dependent Variable is LRFZS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Prob.
C 0.939284 0.013517 69.48692 0.0000
LRFZPWFZP 0.610937 0.251207 2.432005 0.0173
DUMQ1 0.075295 0.014658 5.136866 0.0000
DUMQ2 0.316144 0.016216 19.49635 0.0000
DUMQ3 0.349656 0.014506 24.10343 0.0000
AR(1) 0.356666 0.083258 4.283856 0.0001
R-squared 0.893628 Mean dependent var 1.127675
Adjusted R-squared 0.886810 S.D. dependent var 0.165395
S.E. of regression 0.055645 Akaike info criterion -5.708770
Sum squared resid 0.241518 Schwartz criterion -5.535140
Log likelihood 126.5775 F-statistic 131.0558
Durbin-Watson stat 1.978048 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Inverted AR Roots .36
LS // Dependent Variable is LWFS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Prob.
C 0.397234 0.162024 2.451699 0.0165
LWFPP1 0.078138 0.038901 2.008651 0.0481
LPFEP1 -0.010810 0.009051 -1.194272 0.2361
LWFS(-1) 0.811464 0.087540 9.269591 0.0000
DUMQ1 -0.053915 0.006116 -8.815102 0.0000
DUMQ2 -0.092514 0.004643 -19.92597 0.0000
DUMQ3 -0.046735 0.004292 -10.88825 0.0000
AR(1) -0.255031 0.108297 -2.354917 0.0211
R-squared 0.952040 Mean dependent var 2.582295
Adjusted R-squared 0.947623 S.D. dependentvar 0.050497
S.E. of regression 0.011557 Akaike info criterion -8.830579
Sum squared resid 0.010150 Schwartz criterion -8.599073
Log likelihood 259.6935 F-statistic 215.5228
Durbin-Watson stat 2.267153 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Inverted AR Roots -.26
LS // Dependent Variable is LWCS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Prob.
C 0.438940 0.334426 1.312516 0.1935
LWCPP3 0.139874 0.154003 0.908251 0.3667
LMWAGEP3 -0.016235 0.054232 -0.299356 0.7655
LWCS(-1) 0.969505 0.088452 10.96083 0.0000
LWCS(-2) -0.644245 0.121902 -5.284943 0.0000
LWCS (-3) 0.650398 0.087711 7.415204 0.0000
MDP -0.025632 0.013702 -1.870708 0.0654
DTP -0.018430 0.013524 -1.362683 0.1772
DUMQ1 -0.112967 0.020434 -5.528293 0.0000
DLIMQ2 0.025675 0.015253 1.683351 0.0966
DUMQ3 -0.149027 0.019477 -7.651300 0.0000
R-squared 0.984345 Mean dependent var 2.361723
Adjusted R-squared 0.982201 S.D.dependent var 0.232983
S.E. of regression 0.031083 Akaike info criterion -6.820633
Sum squared resid 0.070530 Schwartz criterion -6.502312
Log likelihood 178.2758 F-statistic 459.0142
Durbin-Watson stat 2.088224 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
LS // Dependent Variable is LWBS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Prob.
C 0.791748 0.152879 5.178909 0.0000
LWBPP3 0.067301 0.040344 1.668186 0.0994
T 0.001250 0.000507 2.465804 0.0160
DTP -0.063689 0.026403 -2.412247 0.0183
MDP -0.041172 0.024594 -1.674100 0.0983
DUMQ1 0.067066 0.022324 3.004158 0.0036
DUMQ2 -0.175464 0.033605 -5.221400 0.0000
DUMQ3 -0.394993 0.026935 -14.66479 0.0000
LWBS(-1) 0.700263 0.072775 9.622336 0.0000
R-squared 0.917693 Mean dependent var 1.861655
Adjusted R-squared 0.908914 S.D. dependent var 0.180119
S.E. of regression 0.054361 Akaike info criterion -5.723266
Sum squared resid 0.221632 Schwartz criterion -5.462822
Log likelihood 130.1864 F-statistic 104.5284
Durbin-Watson stat 1.798116 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
LS // Dependent Variable is LWFZS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Prob.
C 0.481738 0.123171 3.911140 0.0002
LWFZPP3 0.211392 0.055841 3.785646 0.0003
DUMQ1 0.068186 0.014932 4.566388 0.0000
DUMQ2 0.309258 0.016207 19.08152 0.0000
DUMQ3 0.347969 0.014717 23.64377 0.0000
AR(1) 0.262896 0.092423 2.844498 0.0057
R-squared 0.899737 Mean dependent var 1.127675
Adjusted R-squared 0.893310 S.D. dependent var 0.165395
S.E. of regression 0.054024 Akaike info criterion -5.767909
Sum squared resid 0.227649 Schwartz criterion -5.594279
Log likelihood 129.0613 F-statistic 139.9904
Durbin-Watson stat 1.925830 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Inverted AR Roots .26
LS // Dependent Variable is LFMS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Prob.
C 1.175332 0.489707 2.400071 0.0190
LAMPPFEED 0.082271 0.043993 1.870079 0.0655
LPCOWPFEED -0.040142 0.020865 -1.923870 0.0583
LFMS(-1) 0.792339 0.114138 6.941922 0.0000
LFMS(-2) -0.576898 0.129669 -4.449015 0.0000
LFMS(-3) 0.453296 0.109471 4.140802 0.0001
DTP -0.025471 0.009048 -2.815158 0.0063
MDP -0.020561 0.008783 -2.341007 0.0220
DUMQ1 -0.001197 0.011920 -0.100447 0.9203
DUMQ2 0.044282 0.013163 3.364090 0.0012
DUMQ3 -0.027881 0.012619 -2.209504 0.0303
LT 0.042780 0.018562 2.304645 0.0241
R-squared 0.969249 Mean dependent var 3.550232
Adjusted R-squared 0.964551 S.D. dependentvar 0.088284
S.E. of regression 0.016622 Akaike info criterion -8.062498
Sum squared resid 0.019893 Schwartz criterion -7.715239
Log likelihood 231.4341 F-statistic 206.3080
Durbin-Watson stat 1.994268 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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